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I. INTRODUCTION TO MARKET SOCIALISM
Prior to Deng Xiaoping's leadership, private ownership and foreign
investment were considered incompatible with the socialist state of The
People's Republic of China.' During the past two decades, however, China
has challenged that paradigm. 2 China has enacted free market reforms
while attempting to maintain the ideology of a socialist state.' This
Chinese economic experiment has been called the Market Socialist
Economy."
In 1979, China enacted the Joint Venture Law to encourage foreign
investment in its Market Socialist Economy.' This Note introduces China's
Joint Venture Law, the complicated approval procedures that create
disputes among joint venture partners and the resolution of such disputes
through commercial arbitration in China. Once the legal foundation for the
enforcement of a Chinese arbitration award is explored, this Note
considers the real prospects for enforcement of the award in the United
States and China. This is accomplished through the analysis of cases where
Chinese arbitration awards have been enforced in the United States and by
exposing the local protectionism that creates an obstacle for enforcement
in China's courts. In the final analysis, this Note supports the conclusion
that China should decentralize joint venture approval procedures while
centralizing judicial review for the enforcement of arbitration awards by
Chinese courts.
II. BACKGROUND

A. China'sJoint Venture Law: Promising,Yet Disappointing
The basic idea behind the Joint Venture Law was to offer preferential
tax treatment and access to the Chinese market, in exchange for foreign

1. Robert F. Dernberger, China's Economic Reforms, ASIA-PACIFIC REPORT (1989),
reprintedin THE CHNESE: ADAPTINGTHEPASTFACING THE FunURE 546-47 (Robert F. Dernberger,

et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter THE CHINESE].
2. See id. at 547.

3. See id.
4. See id. at 548.
5. The Law ofthe People's Republic of'China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign

Investment (adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979,
promulgated on and effective as of July 8, 1979), CHINALAW No. 41, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, China Laws and Regulations from the People's Republic of China file [hereinafter Joint

Venture Law].
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currency and technology. 6 The Joint Venture Law offers a two to three
year tax reduction period, starting the first profit making year, if the joint
venture is recognized as a technologically advanced business.7 A joint
venture is allowed access to China's market while a local Chinese partner
can serve as the local guide to the complexities of doing business in that
market
On paper, the joint venture arrangement offered a win-win opportunity
to Chinese and foreign investors. The law proved to be so popular that by
1999 Chinese authorities had approved over three hundred thousand
foreign invested enterprises. 9 In practice, however, joint ventures have
often failed to meet expectations, prompting foreign investors to either
buy-out their Chinese counterpart or liquidate to cut losses.'" When ajoint
venture fails to meet investor expectations, disputes can arise. Therefore,
every joint venture contract should provide for the resolution of disputes
by means of a reliable venue. Many joint venture contracts provide for
international commercial arbitration in China.
B. The Rise of CIETAC: History of
InternationalCommercialArbitration in China
The birth of international commercial arbitration in China can be traced
back to 1956 when the China Council for the Promotion of International
Trade ("CCPIT") established the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission
("FTAC")." Following the enactment of the Joint Venture Law of 1979,
the purpose of FTAC was reformed to specifically include the settlement
of disputes among Chinese and foreign joint venture partners. 2 FTAC's
6. See id. arts. 7, 8; see also The People's Republic of China: Regulations for Implementing
the Law on Chinese-Foreign Joint Ventures (Promulgated by the State Council on Sept. 20, 1983),
22 I.L.M. 1033 [hereinafter Implementing Regulations] (stating that a joint ventures export
products are exempt from certain taxes).
7. See Joint Venture Law, supranote 5, art. 7.
8. See id. art. 9.
9. The Stumbling Blocks to LiquidatingJoint Ventures: Nowhere to Run, BUSNESS CHINA,
July 5, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2497954 [hereinafter Nbwhere to Run].
10. See id.; cf GUOCO GROUP LIMITED, 1993-1994 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (HONG KONG: 1994).
Guoco Group Ltd. owns and operates one of the largest banks in Hong Kong and has numerous
investments in China. Guoco's experience shows that even large investors can find it difficult to
earn a profit in China. In 1994, the Group reported a record growth of 1360/, earning a profit of HK
$1.3 billion (US $175 million). See id. at 2. However, the Group's trading and manufacturing
sectors in China were reported to be expanding with "circumspection[,]" probably due to start up
losses in those sectors. See id. at 6.
11. Ren Jianxin, Vice-President, Supreme People's Court of the PRC, Mediation,
Conciliation,Arbitration and Litigation in the People's Republic of China, INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS LAWYER, Oct. 1987, at 396-97, reprintedin CHINESE LAW: CONTRACT, GUANXI, AND
DISPUTE RESOLUTION INCHINA 363-65 (Tahiri v. Lee ed., 1997).
12. See id. at 397.
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change in mission was accompanied by a change in name to the Foreign
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission ("FETAC"). 3 In 1988, the
commission received its most recent name change to the China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission ("CIETAC").4
In 1989, thirteen foreigners were added to the CIETAC panel of
arbitrators." The remaining list, however, was made up of ninety-six
Chinese nationals, and eight of the thirteen foreigners were Hong Kong
Chinese. 6 The most dramatic reform of the CIETAC panel of arbitrators
was the 1994 addition of more than sixty foreigners, representing a variety
of nationalities, and including experts in international commercial law and
arbitration.' By the mid 1990's, CIETAC had become the most active
international commercial arbitration body in the world.'
Today CIETAC hasjurisdiction over disputes that involve international
and external economic transactions.' 9 Prior to the revision of the CIETAC
rules in 1994, CIETAC jurisdiction did not include "external"
transactions.2" The use of the word "external" in the revised version of the
13. See State Council's Notice Concerning the Conversion of Foreign Trade Arbitration
Commission into Foreign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission, CHINALAW No. 56,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, China Laws and Regulations from the People's Republic of
China file.
14. See The State Council's Official Reply Concerning the Renaming of the Foreign
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission as the China International Economic and Trade
Arbitration Commission and the Amendment of its Arbitration Rules (June 21, 1988), CHINALAW
No. 0481, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, China Laws and Regulations from the People's
Republic of China file.
15. See Jan Paulsson & Alastair Crawford, 1994 Revision of CIETAC Rules Promises
IncreasedNeutrality in Arbitration in China,INTERNATIONAL ARBrrRATION REPORT, June 1994,
at 1.
16. See id.
17. See List ofCIETACArbitrators[hereinafter List ofArbitrators],reprintedin, SLAUGHTER
& MAY HONG KONG, SLAUGHTER AND MAY CIETAC ARBITRATION, 1994, at 7-23 [hereinafter
SLAUGHTER AND MAY REPORT].

18. See Gao Bianhua, China: Arbitration Field Applauded, CHINA DAILY, Apr. 3, 1996
[hereinafter Arbitration Field]. In 1995 CIETAC heard 902 cases and settled 892, more than any
other major international commercial arbitration commission. See id.
19. See China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission CIETAC
Arbitration Rules (Revised and adopted on Mar. 17, 1994 at the First Session of the Standing
Committee of the Second National Congress of the China Council for the Promotion of
International Trade (China Chamber of International Commerce)), 34 I.L.M. 1663 (1995)
[hereinafter CIETAC Rules]. CIETAC "resolves, by means of arbitration, disputes arising from
international or external... economic and trade transactions." Id. art. 2.
20. See China International Economic And Trade Arbitration Commission, Arbitration Rules
(adopted on Sept. 12, 1988 at the Third Session ofthe First National Congress of the China Council
for the Promotion of International Trade (China Chamber of International Commerce)), CHINALAW
No. 0483, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, China Laws and Regulations from the People's
Republic of China file [hereinafter 1988 CIETAC Rules]. CIETAC's jurisdiction according to the
language of Article 2 in the 1988 CIETAC Rules included only "disputes arising from international

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss3/4
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rules was intended to assure that Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan would
be included in the jurisdiction of the commission." The jurisdiction of
CIETAC includes any dispute between a foreigner and a Chinese, two
foreigners, or two Chinese. 2 CIETAC jurisdiction over the arbitration of
a dispute requires a written application from one of the parties to the
dispute.23 The application should be accompanied by proof of an
arbitration agreement stating that the parties chose CIETAC to arbitrate
their disputes.24 Such agreement can exist
in the form of an arbitration
25
clause within the joint venture contract.
If the party moving for arbitration fails to present an arbitration
agreement the dispute could end up in court.26 For instance, a respondent
could challenge the jurisdiction of CIETAC.27 If successful, the dispute
economic and trade transactions" with no reference to "external" transactions. See id.
21. Cheng Dejun, Report on the DraftAmendmentto the [CIETACRules]I CHINA INT'L COM.
ARB. 1993-1994 Y.B. at 79 [hereinafter CICA YEARBOOK]. According to Mr. Cheng Dejun:

[11f "international" is not mentioned together with "external," many cases,
including cases involving Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, may easily be
excluded from the jurisdiction limits of the Arbitration Commission ....
Therefore, with "international" and "external" combined, the relevant provision
seems to have become perfect.
Id.
22. See CIETAC Rules, supra note 19, art. 2. Article 2 of the CIETAC Rules provides for

jurisdiction over "disputes between foreign legal persons and/or natural persons and Chinese legal
persons and/or natural persons, between foreign legal persons and/or natural persons, and between
Chinese legal persons and /or natural persons." Id.
23. See id. art. 14(1).
24. See id.

25. CIETAC provides the following model arbitration clause:
Any dispute arising from or in connection with this Contract shall be submitted
to China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission for
arbitration which shall be conducted by the Commission in Beijing or by its
Shenzhen Sub-Commission in Shenzhen or by its Shanghai Sub-Commission in
Shanghai at the Claimant's option in accordance with the Commission's
arbitration rules in effect at the time of applying for arbitration. The arbitral award
is final and binding upon both parties.
CICA YEARBOOK, supra note 21, at 185.

26. See Law of Civil Procedure of the People's Republic of China (adopted at the Fourth
Session of the Seventh National People's Congress on April 9, 1991, promulgated by Order No.
44 of the President of the People's Republic of China on April 9, 1991, and effective as of April
9, 1991), art. 246 [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law] available in <http://www.qis.net/
chinalaw/prclaw34.htm>. According to Article 246 of China's Civil Procedure Law, any disputes

arising from foreign equity joint ventures are reserved to the jurisdiction of the People's Courts.
See id.

27. See CIETAC Rules, supra note 19, art. 6.
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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would most likely end up in China's courts.28 Conversely, a valid
arbitration clause should bar a party from attempting to bring an action in
the courts. 9
C. Enforcing CIETAC Awards in Theory
The foundation for the enforcement of international arbitration awards
is the New York Convention ("Convention").30 The Convention provides
for the "recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards made in the
territory of a State other than the State where the recognition and
enforcement of such awards are sought."'" The Convention has been
ratified by over eighty-nine countries, including the People's Republic of
China and the United States.32 In the United States, the Convention takes
effect through the Federal Arbitration Act.33
Without this Convention, China and the United States would have no
obligation to enforce awards granted by the other state, since no other
reciprocal treaties provide for such enforcement.34 Ratification of the
Convention, therefore, makes it possible for China's courts to enforce
awards settled through international arbitration held outside of China and
for CIETAC awards to be enforced in the United States.35
The Convention requires a written agreement whereby the parties agree
to submit differences arising from their legal relationship to arbitration.36
If a party seeks recourse in a U.S. court contrary to a valid arbitration
agreement, the Convention mandates that upon request from the opposing
party, the court shall "refer the parties to arbitration."" A party seeking to
enforce a CIETAC award in a U.S. court will need to include such an
28. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 26, art. 256.
29. See id., art. 257. Article 257 states that "if the parties have included an arbitration clause
in their contract or have subsequently reached a written arbitration agreement ... no party may
institute an action in a People's Court." Id. Moreover, if a party decides to disregard the agreement
and institute an action in the courts, Article 111(2) of the Civil Procedure Law states that the court
shall "inform the plaintiff to apply for arbitration to the arbitration institution." Id. art. 111(2).
30. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, Done at New York Entered Into Force for the United States on June 7, 1959, 330

U.N.I.T.S. 38, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2 B.D.I.E.L. 979 [hereinafter New York Convention].
31. See id. art. I.

32. See id.Other parties to the New York Convention include the People's Republic ofChina
and the United States, both with declarations and reservations. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (West 1999).
33. See 9 U.S.C.A. § 201 (stating that the New York Convention will be enforced in the

United States "in accordance with this chapter").
34. See James D. Zirin, Confucian Confusion, FORBES ON-LINE, Feb. 24, 1997,
<http://www.forbes.com/forbes19710224/ 5904136a.htm> (stating that China has no bilateral
treaties with the United States for the enforcement of arbitration awards).
35. See New York Convention, supra note 30, art. I.
36. See id. art. HI(1).
37. Id. art. 11(3).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol12/iss3/4
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agreement along with the original award as part of any application for
recognition and enforcement.38
Assuming a valid arbitration agreement calling for arbitration through
CIETAC is presented along with the final award, Article V of the
Convention specifies the only circumstances under which a U.S. court may
refuse to enforce the award.3 9 These include lack of proper notice of the
appointment of arbitrators or of arbitration proceedings to the losing party,
as well as awards that are contrary to the public policy of the United
States.40 Barring the demonstration of a condition specified in Article V,
it appears that U.S. courts would be obliged to enforce a valid CIETAC
award.
The Convention calls for the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards
in accordance with the procedural rules of the country where enforcement
is sought.4 As such, the Civil Procedure Law of China will govern the
enforcement of both foreign and domestic arbitration awards.4 2 That law
obligates the party seeking to enforce an arbitration award to file for
enforcement in the Intermediate People's Court.43 If the award is not void
for lack of jurisdiction, procedural mistakes, or determined to be against
the public interest of China, the court has an obligation to see the award
enforced." Therefore, it appears that international arbitration awards in
general, and CIETAC awards in particular, should be readily enforceable
both in U.S. and Chinese courts.
III. STATUS

Quo ANALYSIS

A. Complex Joint Venture Approval and
LiquidatingProceduresInvite Disputes
Despite impressive free market reforms, China's socialist market
economy is not laissez-faire. The traditional Chinese planned economy

38. See id. art. IV(l).
39. See id. art. V; see also 9 U.S.C.A. § 207 (West 1999).
40. See New York Convention, supra note 30, art. V.
41. See id. art. III (stating that each contracting state shall enforce arbitration awards
according to the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon).
42. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 26.
43. See id. art. 259. Article 259 of the Civil Procedure Law states: "If one party fails to
perform the arbitral award, the other party may apply for its enforcement to the intermediate
people's court of the place where the party against whom the application for enforcement is made
has his domicile or where his property is located." id.
44. See id. art. 260; see also New York Convention, supra note 30, art. V (dealing with lack
ofjurisdiction, procedural mistakes, and awards determined to be against the public interest of the
country in which enforcement of the award in being sought).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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consisted of annual plans that encompassed every sector of the economy.45
Today, the influence of the plans has been significantly diminished and
decentralized, but they do still exist.46 If ajoint venture is not accounted for
in the annual plans, it could encounter difficulty acquiring raw materials
for its operations.
To avoid being excluded from the economic plans, ajoint venture must
receive approval from the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Economic
Relations and Trade ("MOFERT").47 MOFERT could in turn require
approval by the local government or ministry in charge of the applicable
industry.4" Therefore, the joint venture agreement will often be negotiated
with a variety of representatives of different bureaucratic departments.49
The number of parties involved in the approval process can make it
difficult to identify responsibility when disputes arise.
The bureaucracy of joint venture approval procedures and the
interrelationship between the Chinese partner and the government
authorities involved invites potential conflicts of interests on the part of the
Chinese partner. Individual directors of the joint venture could have
personal or corporate interests as well.50 The Joint Venture Law, however,
does not mandate disclosure of conflicts of interest.5 ' Thus, it is unclear
whether a party could remedy such a conflict through arbitration.
Complicating matters further, the board of directors of a joint venture
is required to reach unanimous consent for approval on important
matters." Among these matters is the decision to dissolve the joint
venture.53 If a party wishes to discontinue the business relationship, it must

45. See THE WORLD BANK, CHINA: THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM INCHINA: SOCIALIST ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 1: THE ECONOMY, STATISTICAL SYSTEM, AND BASIC DATA. A WORLD BANK
COUNTRY STUDY (1983), reprintedin THE CHINESE, supra note 1, at 533.
46. See THE CHINESE, supra note 1, at 547.

47. See Implementing Regulations, supra note 6, art. 8.
48. See id.
49. See THE LIFE AND DEATH OF A JOINT VENTURE INCHINA 6 (Freeman, Duncan, ed., Hong
Kong: Asia Law and Practice Ltd., 1993).
50. See Susan Finder, The PRCEquityJointVenture Law, HONG KONG LAWYER, Nov. 1994,
at 18-20. Ms. Finder states:
[U]nder the current law, there is no requirement for a director of a joint venture
to declare his interest in a transaction and for that to be considered. Many joint
venture disputes involve accusations of directors having a personal or corporate
interest in a major decision taken by the joint venture.
Id.
51. See id.
52. See Implementing Regulations, supra note 6, art. 36.
53. See id. art. 36(2).
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get every director to agree." If unanimous consent is not possible, a
dispute is likely to arise.
B. CIETAC's PromisingReformsfor
CommercialArbitration in China
More foreign arbitrators on CIETAC's list of arbitrators will mean
more choices for parties who wish to establish a nationality-neutral
tribunal. The CIETAC Arbitration Rules" entitle the claimant to appoint
one arbitrator from the list.56 The respondent then has twenty days to
appoint a second arbitrator." The chairman then has the authority to
appoint the presiding arbitrator.58 Thus, the neutrality of the tribunal
depends on the appointment of the presiding arbitrator, which is left to the
discretion of the commission.59 If a party has reason to suspect that an
arbitrator has a conflict of interest, that party has the right to challenge the
arbitrator's appointment and request that he or she be replaced.60
The CIETAC rules previously mandated that arbitration proceedings be
held in the Chinese language.6' The 1994 revision of the CIETAC rules
allows parties to choose the language of the arbitration proceedings.62 To
the foreign investor, these reforms have made CIETAC a more attractive
venue for the settlement of joint venture contract disputes with Chinese
partners.
Another attractive feature of arbitration through CIETAC is the concept
of conciliation.63 Authority for conciliation proceedings can be found in
laws governing joint ventures and the procedural regulations of China.'
China's combination of arbitration with conciliation has settled about thirty

54. See id.
55. CIETAC Rules, supra note 19.
56. See id. art. 14(3).
57. See id. art. 16.
58. See id. art. 24.
59. See id.
60. See id. art. 29. Article 29 states that any party may request the removal of an arbitrator,
if the party has justified reasons to suspect the impartiality of the arbitrator. See id.
61. See 1988 CIETAC Rules, supra note 20, art. 39.
62. CIETAC Rules, supra note 19, art. 75. Article 75 provides that the "Chinese language
is the official language of the Arbitration Commission. If the parties have agreed otherwise, their
agreement shall prevail." Id.
63. See id. art. 46.
64. Article 14 ofthe Joint Venture Law states: "Disputes arising between the parties to ajoint
venture that the board of directors cannot settle through consultation may be settled through
mediation or arbitration." Joint Venture Law, supranote 5, art. 14. In addition, article 48 of the
Economic Contract Law states that when there are disputes over an economic contract, the

interested parties should consult with each other to settle the disputes. See China: Economic
Contract Law, Mar. 1983, 22 I.L.M. 330, art. 48.
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percent of CIETAC disputes.65 By settling a dispute through conciliation,
parties have a better chance of salvaging their relationship.66 Furthermore,
since conciliation is strongly encouraged, parties may find it easier to
submit to without losing face or suggesting that their case is weak.
Abuse of so called friendly consultations, however, could delay the
momentum of a dispute. A party that has little to gain from proceeding to
arbitration could sabotage the process by prolonging consultation. Such
abuse can be avoided if the parties agree to include a time limit for
conciliation in their joint venture contract.
CIETAC has made real progress toward providing a neutral venue for
the settlement of joint venture disputes. Moreover, it appears prepared to
tackle the complex nature of such disputes with a diverse list of arbitrators.
The question of whether CIETAC offers an effective dispute resolution
alternative however, will depend on the enforceability of its awards in
practice.
C. Enforcing CIETAC Awards in the United States
The provisions of the New York Convention and their application
through the Federal Arbitration Act are likely to be reassuring to a Chinese
party hoping to enforce a CIETAC award in the United States. However,
even those who are relatively unfamiliar with the U.S. common law system
will want to know how U.S. courts have interpreted the Convention. More
specifically, parties seeking to enforce a CIETAC award will want to know
whether U.S. courts will apply the Convention to enforce that award. That
question was recently answered in the affirmative by U.S. courts in the
District of Minnesota and the Southern District of New York.
The U.S. District Court of Minnesota applied the Convention to enforce
a CIETAC award in Polytek EngineeringCo. v. JacobsonCo.67 That case
involved a contract for the sale of certain rubber recycling equipment from
Plaintiff, a Hong Kong corporation, to a Chinese corporation.6" Pursuant
to that contract, Plaintiff subsequently sent a purchase order to Defendant,
a Minnesota corporation.69 Plaintiff attached the contract to the purchase
order, including a clause that stated: "All the terms and conditions should
conform with the main contract attached."7 ° The attached contract, between
Plaintiff and the Chinese corporation, named CIETAC's predecessor as the
65. Prof. Tang Houzhi, Vice Chairman of CIETAC, CIETAC Arbitration and the
Development ofArbitration in the Asia-Pacific Region, Speech Given in Hong Kong (Mar. 3-4,
1994), in CICA YEARBOOK, supra note 21, at 105.
66. See id.
67. 984 F. Supp. 1238 (D. Minn. 1997).
68. See id. at 1239.
69. See id.
70. Id.
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arbitration body of choice for the resolution of any disputes between the
parties.7
Pursuant to the purchase order and attached contract, Defendant
manufactured and delivered the equipment.12 However, after Plaintiff
subsequently delivered the equipment to the Chinese purchaser, that party
claimed that the equipment failed to conform to the contract
specifications." The Chinese purchaser sought and won an arbitration
award against Plaintiff for damages of $1.2 million and an order that
Plaintiff collect the equipment at Plaintiff's cost.7 4 Plaintiff consequently
commenced a CIETAC arbitration proceeding against Defendant."
Despite being notified of the impending arbitration proceedings,
Defendant failed to appear before CIETAC, and aside from an initial denial
of CIETAC's jurisdiction, made no additional objections.76 CIETAC
granted Plaintiff a $1.7 million award and ordered Defendant to collect the
equipment.77 Plaintiff later filed an action in the United States to enforce
the CIETAC award against Defendant.7" Defendant argued against
enforcement of the CIETAC award because it claimed that it never agreed
to arbitration in China.79
The issue in Polytek was whether an arbitration clause of a contract
attached to a purchase order would satisfy the Convention's requirement
for a written agreement to enforce a CIETAC award against a U.S.
manufacturer who delivered non-conforming equipment pursuant to the
purchase order."0 The court in Polytek determined that the Convention
requires the application of a four part test when deciding whether to
enforce a foreign arbitration award.8" According to the court in Polytek, the
Convention requires first, a written agreement; second, arbitration within
the territory of a signatory of the Convention; third, that the agreement
arise from a legal and commercial relationship; and fourth, a foreign party
or a reasonable relationship to a foreign state.82 The court did "not consider
the last three questions to be in serious dispute."83 The court, therefore,

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at
See id.
See id. at
See id.
at
See id.
See id. at
See id.
Id.

1240.
1238.
1241.
1240.
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focused on the requirement of a written agreement."
Considering whether on these facts an agreement to arbitrate in China
existed between Plaintiff and Defendant, the court seemed to be persuaded
by the fact that the parties waited until the initial contract was formed
before forming their own agreement with a subsequent purchase order.85
Moreover, analyzing other aspects of the transaction, the court reasoned
that the parties were heavily influenced by the initial contract.86 Finally, the
court noted that despite evidence of correspondence between the parties
regarding other aspects of the deal, there was no evidence that Defendant
ever objected to the arbitration provision in the contract.87 Faced with the
facts in Polytek, the court found that a written arbitration agreement
existed and, therefore, that the requirement of Article III of the Convention
was satisfied.88
The court then considered whether enforcement of the CIETAC award
at issue should otherwise be refused by the application of Article V of the
Convention.89 After detailing the various challenges that Article V affords
a party seeking to block the enforcement of a CIETAC or other foreign
award, the court stopped short of considering challenges to enforcement
because Defendant failed to present any argument in that regard. 9° In
conclusion, the court in Polytek held that a U.S. court must enforce a
foreign arbitration award when a written agreement to arbitrate exists in a
contract attached to a purchase order and defendant otherwise fails to
present any challenges pursuant to Article V of the Convention.9
Another example of a CIETAC award enforced against a U.S. party
pursuant to the Convention is provided in Anhui Provincial Import &
Export Corp. v. HartEnterprisesInternational,Inc.92 In that opinion from
the Southern District of New York, a Chinese party (Petitioner) sought to
enforce a CIETAC award, pursuant to the New York Convention, against
a New York textile purchaser (Respondent) for breach of contract.93
CIETAC appointed an arbitrator on behalf of Respondent when
Respondent failed to do so despite notification from CIETAC. 94

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See id. at 1241.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1242.
See id.
See id.
1996 WL 229872 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See id. at 1.
See id.
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Instead, Respondent sought an action in U.S. District Court against
Petitioner." Concurrently, CIETAC notified Respondent of the impending
arbitration proceedings in Beijing.96 Respondent again ignored the notice
and did not seek to stay arbitration pending its concurrent action in the
U.S. District Court. 9 7 Respondent was directed by the court to arbitrate in
Beijing only days after CIETAC had already conducted its hearing on the
matter.9" CIETAC notified Respondent of the hearing and allowed it an
additional fifteen days to present any opposition.99 Respondent again
failed to respond to CIETAC.'0° CIETAC entered an award for Petitioner
who subsequently sought to enforce it in the United States pursuant02 to the
Convention."'0 In its defense, Respondent claimed lack of notice. 1
The issue before the court in Anhui was whether, on those facts,
enforcement of a CIETAC award should be denied for lack of proper
notice or because enforcement would be against public policy, pursuant to
the Convention. 3 The Convention allows a court to refuse the
enforcement of a foreign arbitration award for lack of proper notice, or
because such enforcement would be contrary to the public policy of the
United States. ° The court considered, but was not persuaded by,
Respondent's claim that it had reached an agreement with Petitioner that
each would stay their respective actions.'05 Nevertheless, the court held
that Respondent did not lack proper notice and that enforcement of the
CIETAC
arbitration award did not violate the public policy of the United
10 6
States.
The language of the opinion suggests that the court was persuaded, and
perhaps even perturbed, by the fact that Respondent had essentially
ignored CIETAC during every step of the arbitration process.'0 7 Despite
several notices from CIETAC, Respondent failed to name an arbitrator,
failed to submit a defense, received an additional opportunity to present a
defense, and again failed to respond.' 8

95.
F. Supp.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id.; see also Hart Enter. Int'l, Inc. v. Anhui Provincial Import & Export Corp., 888
587 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
See HartEnter. Int'l, 888 F. Supp. at 587.
Anhui, 1996 WL 229872 at 1.
See id. at 1-2.
See id. at 2.
See id.
See id. at 1.
See id.
See id. at 3.
See id.; see also New York Convention, supra note 30, art. V.
Anhui, 1996 WL 229872 at 1.
See id. at 3-4.
See id.
See id.
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The court in Polytek focused on whether the U.S. Defendant under
those facts had agreed, or at least acquiesced, to arbitration in China."9 In
Anhui, the court dealt with the issue of proper notice and whether a public
policy existed against enforcement of that CIETAC award." ° As such,
neither of those cases provides an extended discussion on comity or the
public policy considerations behind the recognition of foreign arbitration
awards. Those cases do, however, provide examples of the spirit and the
letter of the Convention applied by U.S. courts to enforce CIETAC awards.
Of particular interest to the instant analysis is the extent to which the
court in Polytek was willing to go to find the existence of an agreement to
arbitrate in China. It is possible that in the economic reality of the
transaction, involved in that case, the U.S. Defendant never actually
manifested intent to provide for arbitration in China. Moreover, Defendant
was probably surprised to learn that it could be dragged into arbitration in
China by mere reference to an attached contract which seemed to only
provide specifications of the product it agreed to deliver. The court
suggested that it was persuaded by the fact that Defendant did not object
to the arbitration clause in the attached contract."' It remains to be seen
whether future courts will reach similar results if presented with little more
than a defendant's silence as to the existence of an arbitration agreement
in a contract to which it was technically not a party.
Nevertheless, current and potential U.S. partners to joint ventures in
China should take heed of the results in Polytek and Anhui. U.S. investors
in Chinese joint ventures should consider to what extent transactions
through a Chinese joint venture may subject them to otherwise unexpected
arbitration in China. Moreover, whether expected or not, if CIETAC
arbitration proceedings do take place, the U.S. party should at least
consider the consequences of Anhui before adopting a strategy that would
ignore those proceedings.
For the Chinese partner of a Chinese joint venture, the Polytek and
Anhui decisions might not provide binding precedent that can be relied
upon in every district in the United States when seeking to enforce a
CIETAC award against their U.S. counterpart. Nevertheless, Chinese
partners to joint ventures in China can be expected to use those cases as
precedent in the District of Minnesota and the Southern District of New
York, and as persuasive authority in other U.S. districts..

109. See Polytek, 984 F. Supp. at 1241.
110. See Anhui, 1996 WL 229872.
111. See id.
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D. China's Local Courts: Obstaclesto
Enforcement of CIETAC's Awards
In theory, if a CIETAC arbitration award is not void for lack of
jurisdiction, procedural mistakes, or determined to be against the public
interest of China, China's courts have an obligation to enforce the award. 12
In practice however, China's courts have been reluctant to recognize this
obligation."'3
According to China's Civil Procedure Law, disputes arising from
foreign equity joint ventures are reserved to the jurisdiction of China's
courts. 1 4 Commentators have noted, however, that China's court
proceedings are often slow and that judges are plagued by local
protectionism." 5 Even Chinese officials have recognized a trend by local
courts to protect local interests." 6 From the perspective of the foreign
investor, this means that the courts of China are unfavorable venues for
settling joint venture contract disputes.
Foreign investors might wonder whether the courts of Hong Kong
provide an alternative. However, uncertainty remains as to whether the
reference to "China's courts" in the Civil Procedure Law can be interpreted
to include the courts of Hong Kong now that China has regained
sovereignty over that territory. Thus, the unfavorable conditions present in

112. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 26, art. 260; see also New York Convention, supra
note 31, art. 5 (dealing with lack ofjurisdiction, procedural mistakes, and awards determined to be
against the public interest of the country in which enforcement of the award in being sought).
113. See SLAUGHTER AND MAY REPORT, supra note 17, at 1. The report states that "the
readiness of the courts [in China] to enforce such awards may vary from province to province. It
is likely to be the case that they may be more readily enforceable in the more economically
advanced provinces." Id.
114. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 26, art. 246.
115. Alastair Crawford, The Resolutionof ChinaDisputes Through InternationalArbitration
(Freshfields Law Firm, Hong Kong), 1994, at 2. This report states:
[T]here is no such thing as an independentjudiciary in China. Judges' salaries are
often paid by the local government and this can give rise to pressure in situations
where cases involve disputes between local parties and outsiders . . . . The
foreigner will generally be disadvantaged further by the fact that all proceedings
must be conducted in Chinese and by the practical requirement that it must
employ local lawyers to represent it in court.
Id.
116. See id. at 44 (quoting the former president of the Supreme People's Court, Mr. Ren
Jianxin). Mr. Ren stated that "in recent years, local protectionism has seriously affected the judicial
work of the courts .... [Iln order to protect local interests, some courts deviated from the principle
of basing their judgment on the facts and using the law as a basis of their decision and were partial
to local parties." Id.
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China's courts are likely to contribute towards a general preference by
foreign investors for arbitration over litigation in China.
Foreign investors that manage to succeed at arbitration, however, might
not be able to avoid Chinese courts entirely. If the Chinese party refuses
to abide by the award, the foreign investor, pursuant to the New York
Convention or the Civil Procedure Law, will need to seek an action for
enforcement in China's courts. The applicable jurisdiction for the
enforcement of an arbitration award is the place of domicile of the party
opposing enforcement. 7 Therefore, if a foreign investor wins at arbitration
and the Chinese partner refuses to perform the award, the foreign investor
will have to seek enforcement of the award in the courts of the Chinese
partner's place of domicile."' The requirement that the winning party file
an application for enforcement with the courts of the province where the
defendant is domiciled, while otherwise reasonable on its face, tends to
exacerbate the problem of local protectionism." 9 This in turn makes it less
likely that the award will be honored.
When a Chinese court denies enforcement of an award, the parties may
either reapply for arbitration, or institute another action in the courts.'20
This circular process ignores the fact that the parties chose arbitration over
litigation in the first place. It also overlooks the true problem of local
protectionism.
Foreign investors will need to consider the problem of local
protectionism as one of the many calculated risks of doing business in
China. A growing awareness of this risk could cause potential investors to
invest their hard currency in more reliable markets.' Chinese policy
makers should consider that possibility as they contemplate future reforms
to their legal system. Failure to reform the neutrality of the legal system
could thus begin to undermine the potential benefits of China's "Socialist
Market Economy."
IV.

SOLUTIONS PROPOSED BY OTHERS: "DON'T ARBITRATE IN CHINA!"

Some Practitioners have concluded that CIETAC is not well suited for
complex joint venture disputes in China.'22 CIETAC's list of arbitrators,
however, offers a choice of experts with specialized knowledge ranging in

117. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 26, art. 259.
118. Seeid.
119. See id.
120. See id. art. 261.
12 1. See e.g., China's Rocky Road to Dispute Resolution: Rough Justice, BUSINESS CHINA,
Feb. 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL 16823697 [hereinafter Rocky Road to Dispute Resolution]
(stating that adequate dispute resolution provisions are important elements to encouraging foreign
investment).
122. See SLAUGHTER AND MAY REPORT, supra note 17, at 6.
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areas from "Chemical Analysis" to "Banking and Financing Law."'2
Moreover, the sheer number of cases heard by CIETAC probably qualifies
24
it as the world's foremost authority on commercial arbitration in China.1
Other practitioners maintain that CIETAC is not an attractive venue for
the foreign investor and that foreign investors will prefer arbitration
outside of China. 125 The rationale for this conclusion is supported by the
belief that CIETAC is incapable of providing a neutral tribunal because of
the commission's discretion to select the presiding arbitrator. 126 The same
practitioners, however, admit that parties might be able to modify that
discretion with a contract provision that requires the presiding arbitrator to
be of a neutral nationality.'27
At least one Chinese practitioner suggests that the problem of enforcing
CIETAC arbitration awards in China has already been addressed through
the establishment of "Judicial Supervisory Committee[s].' 28 Support for
that position can be found in the procedures for judicial supervision of
China's Civil Procedure Law.'29 The mere existence of judicial review
procedures, however, has not been an effective tool for ensuring the
enforcement of valid arbitration awards. 30 In response to pressure from the
U.S. Congress, the Supreme People's Court addressed the issue in 1995 by
issuing a circular to lower courts requiring its approval to overturn
international arbitration awards.' The extent of sources consulted for this
note, however, could not confirm whether the mandate of that circular will
apply to awards from CIETAC or whether it is only limited to foreign
arbitration awards.

123. See id. at 7-23.
124. See Arbitration Field, supra note 18.
125. See Crawford, supra note 115, at 30.
126. See id. Mr. Crawford states that "there will rarely be any guarantee of securing a neutral
tribunal and the foreign party [may still have] to present its case in Chinese." Id.
127. Freshfield's suggested arbitration clause states: "The [sole/presiding] arbitrator shall not
be a national of the country of domicile of either of the parties to this Contract." Paulsson &
Crawford, supra note 15, at 5.
128. See CICA YEARBOOK, supra note 21, at 107. According to the Vice President of
CIETAC, Prof. Tang Houzhi, a "Judicial Supervisory Committee" can be found "at almost all
levels" of the courts, and has the power to revise decisions made by the court, "even in non-appeal
cases." See id.
129. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 26, arts. 177-178.
130. See e.g., Rocky Road to Dispute Resolution, supra note 121, at I (citing the case of

Revpower, a US based battery maker that sought to enforce a foreign arbitration award against its
Chinese joint venture partner to no avail).

131. See Craig S. Smith, ForeignFirms Win aRound in China:Supreme CourtDecision May
Speed Enforcement ofArbitrationAwards, THE ASIAN WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 1995, available in

1995 WL-WSJA 10231803.
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

The Joint Venture Law should be reformed to decentralize the approval

and negotiating authority within China's government. 3 2 Decentralizing
the approval procedures of the Joint Venture Law should help decrease the
tension that leads to disputes among joint venture partners. This should
also give local authorities the incentive for further reform in order to
compete for the foreign investment market.
The requirements for a unanimous board decision and for the consent
of the approval authority, before the foreign equity joint venture is allowed
to liquidate, should be abolished. Together, those requirements tend to
compel disputes because the foreign investors are left with few alternatives
if they wish to divest themselves from a venture that fails to meet their
expectations.' 33 These disputes, that might otherwise be avoided with
streamlined liquidating procedures, will only increase the burden on a
judiciary that is already criticized for being slow and inefficient.
Local protectionism by the courts can be contained through more
diligent enforcement of already existing judicial review procedures. Those
procedures, however, should specify CIETAC awards among those that
will require approval by the Supreme People's Court before they are
denied enforcement.
It is important to note that the problems associated with the
enforcement of arbitration awards in China are not caused by CIETAC per
se. Any arbitration award, whether foreign or Chinese, must go through the
same court procedures if a losing Chinese party refuses to comply with the
arbitration award.'34 The analysis of this Note has shown that of greatest
concern is the pattern of local protectionism by China's courts. Removing
the provision that obligates a party seeking enforcement of the award to
file an action in the place where the opposing party is domiciled should
help counteract the problem of local protectionism.

132. During the preparation of this note, China was. in the process of enacting a Unified
Contract Law. See generally China'sNew ContractLaw: Unity Amidst Chaos, BUSINESs CHINA,
Apr. 12, 1999, available in 1999 WL 2497875 (stating that the new law is expected to provide a
series of market oriented reforms, and will affect the Sino-Foreign Economic Contract Law). The
general approval and operating regulations for future joint ventures in China may benefit from this
reform. See also E. John Gregory, Note: The Uniform Contract Law of the People's Republic of
China: A First Comparative Look, 12 FLA. J. INT'L L. 467 (1998-2000).
133. Under special circumstances, unilateral liquidation is possible, but still requires consent
from the original approval authority. See e.g., Nowhere to Run, supra note 9.
134. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 26, art. 259; see alsoNew York Convention, supra
note 30, art. III (providing for enforcement of arbitration awards according to the procedure of the
state where the enforcement is being sought).
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VI. CONCLUSION

For the past two decades, China has engaged in free market reforms
while attempting to maintain the facade of a socialist state. China's foreign
equity Joint Venture Law is a product of that slightly inconsistent yet
progressive policy. Today, real problems exist for foreign investors in
Chinese joint ventures. Most, however, are embedded in complications
with the procedure for establishing and operating joint ventures in China.
These complicated procedures tend to foster disputes as investors find it
difficult to meet expectations. The disputes that arise are often settled
through arbitration by CIETAC, in part because litigation in China is not
an attractive alternative to foreigners.
Recent court decisions have shown that CIETAC awards are likely to
be enforceable in the United States. On the other hand, the practice of local
protectionism by China's courts has made it difficult to enforce CIETAC
awards in that country. Until Chinese authorities reform the status quo,
however, complicated approval procedures and local protectionism by
China's courts must be calculated as risks of doing business in China.
Reforms should include both the decentralization of operating procedures
in the Joint Venture Law and centralized judicial review for any CIETAC
award that is denied enforcement. At stake is the potential success or
failure of China's socialist market experiment. If China's legal system
loses credibility, the Chinese people could begin to lose the advantages
brought about by their "Socialist Market Economy." If foreign investors
continue to have bad experiences in China, they may simply divert their
investments to more reliable markets. Given China's growing prominence
in global affairs, the outcome of these issues is likely to have serious
ramifications on our future world order.
For now, foreign investors can at least take comfort in CIETAC's
significant reforms. Unlike the courts in China, CIETAC has taken notable
steps toward creating a reputable venue for joint venture contract dispute
resolution in China. Finally, choosing CIETAC for the resolution ofjoint
venture contract disputes may prove to be thrifty forum shopping because
according to its Vice Chairman, "CIETAC is Cheap!""'

135. Prof.Tang Houzhi, Remarks at Freshfields' International Arbitration Conference in Hong
Kong (Nov. 30, 1994) (on file with Freshfields Law Firm).
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